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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION PROCEDURE-
A PROBLEM AND A SUGGESTION
RAY A. BRowN t
The study of administrative law is undoubtedly entering upon a
new phase. The right of administrative boards or commissions, exer-
cising legislative and judicial as well as executive powers, to exist
and function in spite of the constitutional doctrines requiring the
separation and forbidding the delegation of governmental powers is
now well established. The extent to which the determinations of such
bodies are subject to review in the ordinary courts of justice has been
extensively considered in court decisions and in the writings of the
commentators. However, concerning the administrative method itself
-both in theory and in actual practice---we are relatively uninformed.'
t A. B., 1913, LL. B., 1915, University of Minnesota; S. J. D., 1923, Harvard Law
School; Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin; Author of ADMINISTRATION
OF WORXMEN'S COMPENSATION IN WIscoNSIN (933) ; THE LAw OF PERsoNA. PROP-
ERTY (1936) ; contributor to legal periodicals.
I. The literature on this subject is, however, growing. See BROWN, ADMINISTRA-
TION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN WISCONSIN (1933) ; COOKE, PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION (1924) C. XII; DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1936) ; HARTMAN, PRoCEDuRE AND PROOF BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM-
MISSION IN RATE AND AuLED CASES (1925) ; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION (1924); 4 SHARFmAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1937);
VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (932); Bevis, Procedure in
the Interstate Commerce Commission (1927) I U. OF CiN. L. REV. 24!; Pittman, The
Doctrine of Precedents and the Interstate Commerce Commission (937) 5 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 543; Smith, Practice and Procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commis-
Sion (1937) 5 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 404; Thelen, Practice and Procedure before Ad-
ininistrative Tribunals (1928) I6 CALIF. L. REV. 208; Wheat, Practice and Procedure
before the Railroad Commission of California (1927) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 445; Wheat,
Report of Cincinnati Conference on Functions and Procedure of Administrative Tri-
bunals (1938) 12 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 117.
See also the remarks of Chief Justice Hughes at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of
the American Law Institute, (938) 24 A. B. A. J. 431.
The National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissions is at present en-
gaged in a thorough study of public utility commission procedure, upon which a report
has been made at its annual convention in November, 1938.
The two Morgan decisions, Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936), and
304 U. S. i (1938), indicate on the part of the United States Supreme Court a growing
interest in the fundamental requirements of administrative procedure.
(39)
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This is most unfortunate. Considering the vast amount of legal busi-
ness now being transacted before administrative tribunals,2 the prac-
titioner has a lively interest in ascertaining the rules and principles, if
any, which govern the practice before such tribunals. The general
public has an even more important interest in seeing that these new
governmental agencies employ a procedure which will enable them effi-
ciently to perform the task of governmental regulation placed upon
them and which, at the same time, will afford due protection to the
rights of the individual parties affected by their determinations and
orders.'
There is evidence that the legal profession, having passed through
the stage of futile protest against administrative government, is now
turning its attention to the matter of administrative method. The
Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association
once proposed, although without success, a super-administrative court
modeled on judicial lines. In other quarters, courts of administrative
appeal have been suggested. The various schemes for governmental
reorganization stress the desirability for a sharper separation in the
administrative organization between the purely executive, the policy-
making, and the quasi-judicial functions. 4  One hears now and then
of the desirability of some uniform code of administrative procedure.
It is highly probable that the present policy of drifting will not long
continue and that steps will be taken to systematize and regulate the
procedure of our administrative bodies. The important thing is that
such action rest, not on a priori theories and prejudices, but on a clear
understanding of what the commissions are chartered by the state to
do and of what in practice have been found to be safe and efficient
methods. There is a crying need for a Joseph Story or a Greenleaf
to do for administrative law what those masters did for the law of
equity and evidence in their formative stages. The task is, however,
a monumental and extremely difficult one. The number of commis-
sions is legion, and each commission is more or less a unique
phenomenon. Separate legislative acts create each separate commission,
and each commission has its own peculiar duties to perform. The
procedure which it follows is not prescribed by any general law; and
2. It was reported that in 1935 there were seventy-three federal administrative
boards alone with jurisdiction over two hundred sixty-seven types of proceedings. Re-
port of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1936) 61 A. B. A. REP. 723. Fur-
ther statistics are given in McGuire, Reforms Needed in the Teaching of Administrative
Law (1938) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 171, 173.
3. See particularly Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Adminis-
trative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 647.
4. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' POWERS (1932); CUSHMAN, THE
PROBLEM OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1937), being a part of the report
of the President's Committee on Administrative Management; and the several reports
of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association.
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usually the statute, which is its charter of creation, mentions the matter
in only the barest outline, if at all. Therefore, each commission has
been more or less a law unto itself. The importance of first-hand
studies of commission action, though expensive and laborious, cannot
be overestimated. On the other hand, we do find in the published
opinions of the courts, in the statutes, and in commission regulations
and orders much that is of value. Until the more conclusive findings
of first-hand studies are available, use should be made of the above
material, scattered and disorganized though it be.
In the early case of Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Minnesota 5 a
Minnesota statute authorized the Railroad Commission conclusively
to fix railroad rates without a hearing. In holding the statute uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"[The order of the commission] deprives the company of its
right to a judicial investigation, by due process of law, under
the forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of
successive ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a
matter in controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute
finality, the action of a railroad commission which, in view of
the powers conceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded
as clothed with judicial functions, or possessing the machinery of
a court of justice. . . . No hearing is provided for; no sum-
mons or notice to the company before the commission has found
what it is to find, and declared what it is to declare; no oppor-
tunity provided for the company to introduce witnesses before
the commission, in fact nothing which has the semblance of due
process of law. . . . The question of the reasonableness of a
rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving,
as it does, the element of reasonableness both as regards the com-
pany and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination.
If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable
rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place
in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is
deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance
and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law,
and in violation of the Constitution of the United States." 6
The corollary to this case is the opinion of the Court in Interstate Com-
inerce Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.7 In that case the Inter-
5. 134 U. S. 418 (18go). Accord: Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. Igo (1933) ;
Georgia Cont. Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 8 F. Supp. 434 (N. D. Ga. 1934);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Board of R. R. Comm'rs, 76 Mont. 305, 247 Pac. 162
(1926) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm., 192 S. W. 46o (Sup. Ct. Mo.
1917); State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R. R. v. Garesche, 274 Mo. 74, 202 S. W. 400 (1918) ;
Silberberg v. Citizens Water Supply Co., I16 Misc. 595, io N. Y. Supp. 349 (Sup. Ct.
i92i) ; H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 162 Okla. 89, ig P. (2d) 347 (1933).
6. 134 U. S. at 457.
7. 227 U. S. 88 (1913).
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state Commerce Commission, at the instance of the New Orleans Board
of Trade, set aside certain rates between New Orleans and points in
Alabama and Florida, and prescribed a new set of rates. On an appeal
from this decision, the commission contended that it was not required
to base its order on evidence formally introduced at the hearing, but
that it might obtain the information to support its order from such
outside sources as were available to it. The Supreme Court, however,
unanimously held that the commission possessed no such power.
"Such a construction would nullify the right to a hearing,-for
manifestly, there is no hearing when the party does not know
what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an oppor-
tunity to test, explain or refute. . . . The Commission is an
administrative body and, even where it acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity, is not limited by the strict rules, as to the admissibility
of evidence, which prevail in suits between private parties...
But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more
imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evi-
dence by which rights are asserted or defended. . . . All par-
ties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be
considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in explanation
or rebuttal. In no other way can a party maintain its rights or
make its defense. In no other way can it test the sufficiency of
the facts to support the finding; for otherwise, even though it
appeared that the order was without evidence, the manifest defi-
ciency could always be explained on the theory that the Commis-
sion had before it extraneous, unknown but presumptively suffi-
cient information to support the finding." 8
8. Id. at 93. The requirement that public service commission orders affecting the
property interests of the utilities must rest upon evidence in the record applies through
the force of due process of law to the state commissions as well as to the Interstate
Commerce Commission. State ex rel. Oregon R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S.
510 (1912); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268 U. S. 39 (1925).
See further to effect that orders of public utility commissions must be based on evi-
dence in the record: Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 167 (914) ;
Ohio Util. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 267 U. S. 359 (1925) ; Florida v. United States,
282 U. S. 194 (I93i); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 3o, U. S. 292 (i937) ;
Chestnut Ridge Ry. v. United States, 248 Fed. 791 (D. N. J. 1917) ; Monroe Gaslight
Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 292 Fed. 139 (E. D. Mich. 1923) ; Streator Aqueduct Co. v.Smith, 295 Fed. 385 (S. D. Ill. 1923); Montrose Oil Refining Co. v. St. Louis & S. F.
Ry., 25 F. (2d) 8o (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) ; Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States,
36 F. (2d) 789 (W. D. Mo. 1929); Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co., 46
F. (2d) 612 (App. D. C. i93i); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States, 5 F. Supp.
929 (N. D. Ohio, 1933), aff'd, 293 U. S. 454 (I935) ; State Pub. Util. Comm. v. Toledo,
St L. & W. R. R., 286 Ill. 582, z22 N. E. i58 (i919); State Pub. Util. Comm. v.Springfield G. & E. Co., 281 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891 (92o) ; Choate v. Commerce
Comm., 309 Ill. 248, 14z N. E. z2 (923); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce
Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929); Chicago Rys. v. Commerce Comm., 336 Ill.
5i, 167 N. E. 840 (1929); State ex rel. Wabash R. R. v. Public Serv. Comm., 271 Mo.
i55, 196 S. W. 369 (917); People ex rel. N. Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219
N. Y. 84, 13 N. E. 795 (i916) ; People ex rel. Judge v. Public Serv. Comm., i92 App.
Div. 837, 183 N. Y. Supp. 283 (3d Dep't, 1920) ; Erie v. Public Serv. Comm., 278 Pa.
512, 123 Atl 471 (1924).
Where the order of the commission, instead of applying to a single utility, is gen-
eral in operation, it has been characterized as legislative, and the requirements of this
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How does the rule and principle thus enunciated comport with
the theory of administrative action in general, and with public service
company regulation in particular? Beyond doubt our public service
commissions have been charged with the positive and affirmative duty
of regulating, in behalf of the public, the public service corporations.
In the earlier years the predominance in our economic and political
thinking of the laissez faire doctrine left the railroads and the water,
gas, light and power companies of the nation comparatively free from
governmental control and restraint. Abuses, however, sprang up.
Public resentment, culminating in the Granger movement of the
seventies, peremptorily demanded governmental regulation; and many
statutes were passed regulating utility rates and practices. The public
utility commissions were established with the positive duty of seeing
that these laws were obeyed.9 This view of the positive character of
the public service commissions' duties persists in full vigor today and
is clearly represented in the statutes which create them. The following
excerpt is from the Pennsylvania statute: "For the purpose of regulat-
ing public service companies and of carrying out the provisions of this
act an administrative body or commission is hereby established to be
known as the Public Service Commission of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. . . . The Commission shall have full power and au-
thority and it shall be its duty to enforce, execute, and carry out, by
its orders, rulings, and regulations and otherwise . . the provisions
of . . this act relating, respectively, to the duties and limitations,
and to the creation and the powers, and limitations of the powers, of
public service companies." 10 To enable the commissions properly to
rule are somewhat relaxed. The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1926). But even
in this type of matter it is doubtful if the commission can refuse to consider relevant
evidence, or act contrary to it. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S.
248 (1932) (general decrease in grain rates); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United
States, supra (general order it; re locomotive equipment).
A few cases hold that the commission need not depend solely on evidence in the
record to sustain its holdings. Louisiana R. R. Comm. v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212
U. S. 414 (igog) ; Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas-Light Co., 149 Ga. 405, ioo S. E 439 (igg) ;
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Virginia, 147 Va. 43, 136 S. E. 575 (1927); State
ex rel. N. P. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm., 95 Wash. 376, 163 Pac. 1143 (1917). In the
United States and Virginia decisions it appeared, however, that there was a complete
review of the commission decisions in the courts.
9. See 4 SHARFMAX, op. cit. supra note I, at 14; VANDERBLUE AND BURGESS, RAIL-
ROADS, RATES, SERvicE, MANAGEMENT (1923) 3. "The object of law as administered
by the courts is to protect persons in the enjoyment of their rights, and to penalize
others who interfere with these rights. . . . The functions of the regulatory com-
mission differ in this respect-that the rights and duties which it determines and
enforces are nearly always clothed with a public interest. The original concept of rail-
road regulation sought the general protection of the public against abuses thought to
have been brought about by the large organizations of capital which represented rail-
road investment. . . . It is, of course, true that many controversies of a private
nature are adjudicated by railroad regulatory commissions. Yet in their final analysis,
nearly all of these controversies have an element of public interest." Id. at 28.
IO. P.A. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 66, §§ 331, 69I. The powers granted to
the old Commission have been expressly vested in the new Public Utility Commis-
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perform their duty of affirmative regulation and control of the utilities,
the statutes uniformly require the latter to report annually, or as de-
manded, to the commissions detailed information concerning the man-
ner in which their business is conducted; and they also confer upon the
commissions the power of independently investigating the utilities'
books, accounts, premises, equipment, and manner of operation."1
The commissions have not always taken this view of the positive
nature of their duties. Rather, they have often been inclined to con-
sider themselves courts, acting only when their jurisdiction is invoked
by individual consumers or the utilities themselves. Such an attitude,
however, sooner or later results in sharp criticism. In the monu-
mental investigation in 1930 of the New York Commission on Revi-
sion of the Public Service Law, the so-called "judicial attitude" of
the commission towards its duties was one of the chief points of com-
plaint.12 Back in 19o5 Judge Peter Grosscup of the United States
District Court said of the then Interstate Commerce Commission:
"My own judgment is that the Interstate Commerce Commission
. . . has failed in its part of the administrative work of putting
into execution the Interstate Commerce Act. . . . I think it has
deserted the inquisition, which is the commission's part of the
sion. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, §461. Compare the following
from the Wisconsin statute: "The Commission is vested with power and jurisdiction
to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state, and to do all things neces-
sary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction. . . . The com-
mission shall have authority to inquire into the management of the business of all
public utilities, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which
the same is conducted, and may obtain from any public utility all necessary informa-
tion to enable the Commission to perform its duties. . . . The commission shall
inquire into the neglect or violation of the laws of this state by railroads and public
utilities . . . and shall have the power, and it shall be its duty to enforce all laws
relating to railroads or public utilities and report all violations thereof to the attorney
general." Wis. STAT. (1931) 33 i96.o2, 195.o7. See also INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT,
24 STAT. 383, 384, 386 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §3 12, 15, 20 (1926) ; CAL. GEN. LAWS
(Deering, 1931) Act 6386, §§28, 29, 31, 58, 72; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. ilia,
123; 2 MAss. GEN. LAWs (932) c. 159, § 12, c. 164, § 76; 1 Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§§ 5163, 5164, 5165, 5166, 5188, 5190, 5213, 5232; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930)
c. 49, §§ 45, 46, 48, 66, 8o, 94; WIs. STAT. (1931) §§ 192.26, 195.26, 196.24; Wis. LAWS
(1933) c. 317, § I.
II. See supra note IO.
12. Colonel W. J. Donovan, counsel for the commission, in his report to the legis-
lature said, "Under the series of questions aiming to ascertain the attitude of the Com-
mission in its initiative and alertness to discover conditions unfavorable to the public,
the answer frequently came that dissatisfaction will assert itself. That attitude is diffi-
cult to understand. It would seem that any knowledge of human nature would make
clear that dissatisfaction in such matters asserts itself only when a 'boiling point' has
been reached. Such an attitude would indicate a misconception of the original purpose
of the creation of the Public Service Commission which was to safeguard public rights
and interests. . . . This expressed attitude, however, may be due to the so-called
judicial attitude of the Commission, which was subjected to so much criticism." See
I REPORT AND HEARINGS, N. Y. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSIONS LAW (1930) 73. The dissenting members of the legislative commission were
particularly sharp in criticism of the commission on this point: id. at 302. At page 320
of vol. I appears the testimony of Chairman Prendergast of the commission in this mat-
ter. After the commission personnel was changed, a much more aggressive attitude
was displayed. See N. Y. P. S. C. R. (1932).
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work, and has been trying to climb upon the tribune, which is
another part of the work. I think it has put on the robes, when
perhaps it ought to have put on the overalls." 13
Public service commissions are indeed hybrids. Insofar as their
activities affect the property interests of the utilities they regulate, they
are required by constitutional doctrine to be quasi-courts. Insofar as
they are invested by statute with the affirmative duty of securing in
behalf of the public fair rates, adequate service, and freedom from
unnecessary danger, they are of the executive. Constantly do these
functions intermingle. Although in a case before the commission the
formal parties may be the utility and a private consumer, always in
the background stands an invisible party, the general public, whose
interests the commission must watch and protect. A rate, although
fixed in proceedings initiated by a single consumer or group of con-
sumers, affects untold numbers of other patrons who have not formally
appeared before the commission. Although in deciding the case be-
tween the individual parties to the formal record the commission may
be required to adopt a quasi-judicial procedure, it cannot allow the
chance course of the proceedings before it to injure the interest of the
general public. To be both valid and effective, public service com-
mission procedure must not only afford due protection to private prop-
erty interests, but must also be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to
enable the commission to guard and advance the public interest in
utility charges and practices. This is indeed our major problem. The
rule of the Louisville & Nashville R. R. case, requiring the determina-
tions of a commission to be based solely on evidence presented at an
open hearing corresponds perfectly with the judicial ideal. To limit
a body performing the executive function to such data is not only
anomalous, but may be highly inconvenient.
This rule requiring the commissions to base their determinations
only on the evidence introduced at open hearing presents the basic
problem of this article. The discussion may conveniently be divided
into four sub-heads: (i) the possibility of a liberalization of the rule
by applying to public service commissions the doctrine of "judicial
notice", already long employed by the courts; (2) the somewhat similar
question of the power of the commissions to use their own official
records in arriving at their determinations; (3) the power of the
commissions, through their own employees-engineers, accountants,
and other experts-to make independent investigations of the utilities'
13. Quoted in NEWvcomB, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE ORDERS OF THE INTERSTATE
COmMERCE COmmISSION (1905). See also, BAUER, EFFECrV REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES (1925) C. I4 MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933)
C. 3; COo= loc. cit. mipra note I.
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accounts, books, premises, and equipment, and to use the results ob-
tained thereby in deciding cases; (4) the question of what constitutes
adequate evidence on which to base a commission finding and order.
Finally, some suggestions will be made concerning a possible procedure
which will, it is hoped, reconcile the commissions' judicial and ex-
ecutive duties in a way that will secure both efficiency and the due
protection of private rights.
JUDICIAL NOTICE BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS
It is sometimes contended that the doctrine of "judicial notice"
should operate to relieve public service commissions of the necessity
of deciding cases according to the evidence presented and to enable
them to make a determination on the basis of knowledge acquired in
the course of their experience in regulating utilities. Judicial notice
in its more precise sense is the rule which excuses a party to an action
from the necessity of proving by evidence matters which, though
essential to his case, are of such common knowledge or are of such
irrefutable nature that evidentiary proof thereof is redundant and
unnecessary. The corollary to this proposition is that the court, jury
or other trier of the fact may determine the truth of certain matters
on the basis of its own knowledge without the necessity of hearing
evidence. Thus a court may examine public records, geographies,
almanacs, and similar irrefutable data, to determine facts of history,
geography and natural science. The fact that a matter may be judicially
noticed does not, however, preclude a party from disputing it by evi-
dence if he is bold enough to believe that it can be done.
14
In applying the doctrine of judicial notice to public service and
other commissions, the following argument is made. Since courts and
juries may take judicial notice of matters lying within their customary
knowledge, the commissions, "appointed by law and informed by ex-
perience", 15 may, in deciding matters before them, dispense with the
necessity of evidence and utilize the knowledge acquired by them in the
course of their official experience. 6
I4. See State v. Kincaid, 133 Ore. 95, 103, 285 Pac. IIo5, iio8 (1930) ; I WIGMOP,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 567 et seq.; Strahorn, The Process of Judicial Notice (1928)
14 VA. L. RFv. 544.
15. Illinois Central R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 2o6 U. S. 441 (19o7);
State Pub. Util. Comm. v. Springfield G. & E. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891 (I92O).
In this latter case, although the court delivered a peculiarly flattering encomium of the
State Public Utility Commission, it nevertheless refused to sustain the Commission's
findings of fact as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.
16. See the careful discussion of this matter by Hanft, Utilities Commissions as
Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. REv. 12; Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 355.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION PROCEDURE
Public service commissions may undoubtedly take judicial notice
of the same matters of which the regular courts may take notice,
17
and perhaps also of material in the public utility field so notorious to
those informed thereof that production of evidence is unnecessary.' s
The attempt to extend the doctrine of judicial notice beyond these
limits to include so-called matters of expert knowledge has not, how-
ever, been successful. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Util.
Comm. 19 involved proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio to obtain refunds for alleged excessive charges collected by
the telephone company under rates which the company had filed but
which were protested by the consumers. The Ohio commission, after
extensive hearings, fixed a valuation of the company's property in the
state as of June 30, 1925. After the hearing was closed, the commis-
sion undertook to adjust downward this valuation for the years 1926-
1933 by taking "judicial notice" of certain price indices obtained from
technical engineering magazines and from the real estate valuations
disclosed in the tax records of the various localities where the company
property was located. The commission also relied on findings in a
federal court decision in another state concerning the value of equip-
ment furnished the telephone company by one of its affiliates. The
data thus relied upon by the commission was not introduced in evidence,
yet the commission refused the telephone company a rehearing for the
purpose of explaining or rebutting it. The Supreine Court of the
United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Car-
dozo, held that these proceedings were contrary to due process of law.
Concerning the matter of judicial notice, the Court said:
"Courts take judicial notice of matters of common knowl-
edge. ..... They take judicial notice that there has been a de-
pression, and that a decline of market values is one of its con-
comitants. . . . How great the decline has been for this industry
or that, for one material or another, in this year or the next, can
be known only to the experts, who may even differ among them-
selves. . . . Moreover, notice, even when taken, has no other
effect than to relieve one of the parties to a controversy of the
burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence. . . . 'It
does not mean that the opponent is prevented from disputing the
matter by evidence if he believes it disputable.' . . . Here the
contention would be futile that the precise amount of the decline
in values was so determinate or notorious in each and every year
17. The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin thus takes judicial notice of a
period of depression and its effects on the purchasing power of consumers. Mergen v.
Farmers Tel. Co., 2 Wis. P. S. C. R- 350 (1932); Russel v. Commonwealth Tel. Co.,
3 Wis. P. S. C. R. 366 (933).
18. See Hanft, supra note i6, at 29, for citation of cases.
19. 301 U. S. 292 (937).
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between 1925 and 1933 as to be beyond the range of question.
No rational concept of notoriety will include these variable ele-
ments...
"What was done by the Commission is subject, however, to
an objection even deeper. . . . There has been more than an
expansion of the concept of notoriety beyond reasonable limits.
From the standpoint of due process-the protection of the indi-
vidual against arbitrary action-a deeper vice is this, that even
now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which
the Commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its
conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to
find them out. . . . The opportunity [of controverting the evi-
dence] is excluded here. The Commission, withholding from the
record the evidential facts that it has gathered here and there,
contents itself with saying that in gathering them it went to jour-
nals and tax lists, as if a judge were to tell us, 'I looked at the
statistics in the Library of Congress, and they teach me thus and
so.' This will never do if hearings and appeals are to be more
than empty forms." 20
The reasonableness of the Court's holding in the case immediately
above seems to this author apparent. Judicial notice, when applied to
matters known to the parties just as well as the court, or to matters
incapable of refutation, does not impair the substantial rights of the
parties. To permit a tribunal, expert though it may be, to resort with-
out notice to the parties to data of a disputable nature for the purpose
of securing the evidence necessary to sustain its decision, clearly de-
20. Id. at 3o1. In the following cases the court also refused to sustain findings
dependent on matters of which the commission attempted to take judicial notice:
Southern Pac. v. Bartine, i F. (2d) 323 (D. Nev. 1913) (reliance on data gathered
from statistics published by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but not placed in
evidence); Denver & S. L. P. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 Pac. 74
(1918) (reliance on other rates for the purpose of comparison which were not put in
evidence); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831
(1929) (reliance on a finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission that 35 tons
constituted the usual load per car, the court saying: "The commissioners cannot act
on their own information. Their findings must be based on evidence presented in the
case, with an opportunity to all parties to know of the evidence to be submitted or
considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced
as such." Id. at 638, 167 N. E. at 837) ; People ex rel. Judge v. Public Serv. Comm.,
192 App. Div. 837, 183 N. Y. Supp. 283 (3d Dep't, 1920) (reliance by commission on
cost of maintenance and labor in cities of a comparable size to that of the city in which
the public utility involved operated, the court saying: "Clearly it was the right of the
relators to have an opportunity to explain the conditions pertaining to such other cities,
or to show that those cities were not typical or representative instances, or to intro-
duce such evidence as they might desire to refute or overcome the inferences which not
only might be drawn, but which were actually drawn by the commission and which
entered into and became an integral part of the order reducing the rates." Id. at 840,
183 N. Y. Supp. at 285) ; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporations Comm., 90 Okla.
84, 216 Pac. 917 (1923) (cost of natural gas at the mouth of the well contrary to the
figure testified to by the utility); Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. Public Util. Comm.,
81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287 (1932) (petition to abandon an agency station. Commis-
sion could not rely on facts disclosed in another hearing concerning a station twelve
miles away serving a similar territory).
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prives a party of his fundamental right to know the case against him
and to rebut it if he can.
II
USE OF COMMISSION'S OwN REcORDS
A special application of the judicial notice concept to permit ad-
ministrative agents to take notice of their own records and base deci-
sions upon data therein contained has at times been asserted. In the
leading case supporting this view, Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm.,2 1 the commission asserted its right to rely on its records to
show the cost of the service rendered by the railroad. The Supreme
Court of the state affirmed the right of the commission to do this,
saying:
"We do not think it necessary that these public documents be
formally offered in evidence before the Railroad Commission or
certified up to the circuit court in every action brought to review
an order of the Commission. All parties know of their existence,
the appellant itself furnished a report covering the period in ques-
tion, the cost of the services in question was a fact peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant if within the knowledge of
any person, and the statute justly throws the burden of proof
upon the appellant in the matter of showing that the rate fixed
by the Commission is unreasonable. The Commission and the
court may take judicial notice of the contents of these public
records, and both parties are at liberty to present computations
therefrom in argument at any stage of the litigation, even in this
court." 22
This decision is, however, contrary to the federal rule, laid down
in United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.23 The Interstate Com-
merce Commission issued an order for the division of joint interstate
rates between the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Railroad and thir-
teen other carriers. No evidence was offered by the carriers in the
proceedings. It was admitted that the order of the commission rested
in part on data taken from the annual reports of the carriers involved
relating to such matters as the amount of traffic carried, the total
operating revenues, the total operating expenses, and the net revenue.
The commission rested its authority to do this on Rule XIII 24 of its
21. 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1915).
22. Id. at 62, 145 N. W. at 220; see Duluth Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 161
Wis. 245, 256, 152 N. W. 887, 891 (1915) ; Mergen v. Farmers Tel. Co., 2 Wis. P. S.
C. R. 350 (1932); Miller v. Midway Tel. Co., 3 Wis. P. S. C. R. 63 (1932); Russell
v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 3 Wis. P. S. C. R 366 (1933) ; Note (1914) 27 HARv. L.
REv. 683.
23. 265 U. S. 274 (1924).
24. This rule required the parties to the proceedings in offering documentary evi-
dence, including reports on file with the commission, to specify the particular portions
thereof which were offered in evidence and to furnish copies to the opposing counsel.
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rules of practice and on notice by the examiner to the carriers that
reference would be made to these filed annual reports. The Supreme
Court, however, in an unanimous opinion, reversed the commission
under the authority of Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville &
Nashville R. R.
"If the proceeding had been, in form, an adversary one com-
menced by the Orient system, that carrier could not, under rule
XIII, have introduced the annual reports as a whole. For they
contain much that is not relevant to the matter in issue. By the
terms of the rule, it would have been obliged to submit copies of
such portions as it deemed material; or to make specific reference
to the exact portion to be used. The fact that the proceeding was
technically an investigation instituted by the Commission would
not relieve the Orient, if a party to it, from this requirement ...
The objection to the use of the data contained in the annual reports
is not lack of authenticity or untrustworthiness. It is that the car-
riers were left without notice of the evidence with which they
were, in fact, confronted, as later disclosed by the finding made.
The requirement that in an adversary proceeding specific reference
be made is essential to the preservation of the substantial rights
of the parties." 25
Where the records relied upon by the commission are not the
reports of the particular carriers involved in the proceedings before
it, but are records in other proceedings, it follows a fortiori that they
cannot be resorted to without notice.20 In this respect the courts apply
to the commissions the same rule they apply to their own records.2 7
In spite of worthy opinion to the contrary, 28 the writer believes
the rule of the Supreme Court on this question the more reasonable
and just. While by common law or by statute, official reports may
be admissible in evidence, 29 they are not incontestable by the party
who has filed them.30  More important, in commission proceedings
25. 265 U. S. 274, 288 (1924). Accord: Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Bosworth,
209 Fed. 38o (E. D. Ky. 1913); Monroe Gaslight Co. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm.,
292 Fed. 139 (E. D. Mich. 1923); Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Railroad Comm., i F. (2d)
805 (E. D. Ky. 1924).
26. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 Pac. 74
(ii8); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 70, 167 N. E. 831
(1929). In the Monroe case the court said, "If perchance the Commission had in mind
evidence or papers in other cases, or general documents in its files, which showed that
14%. was too high, it had no right to base its findings on such documents or evidence
without calling them to the attention of the Utility and giving it a chance to be heard."
Monroe Gaslight Co. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm.. 292 Fed. 139, 148 (E. D. Mich.
1923).
27. Mathews v. Mathews, 112 Md. 582, 77 Atl. 249 (I9Io), and Note (ii9) 29
L. R. A. (N. s.) 905; Divide Creek Irr. Dist. v. Hollingsworth, 72 F. (2d) 859 (C. C.
A. ioth, 1934), and Note (1935) 96 A. L. R. 937; cf. Amos v. Mosely, 74 Fla. 555, 77
So. 619 (1917) (where the court took judicial notice of legislative journals).
28. Hanft, supra note 16, at 30.
29. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ I633a, 1672.
30. 2 id. § 1O59.
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the record is customarily resorted to not merely to obtain evidence of
a single indisputable relevant fact-for example, that a certain public
utility had received on a certain date a certificate of convenience and
necessity.31 On the contrary, the record is usually referred to for the
purpose of selecting from the great mass of data in the public utilities'
reports such individual items as may be useful to the commission's
purpose. While the utility may not in reason deny the truth of the
single statements of fact contained in its voluminous reports, it should
have the opportunity to know which of these items the commission is
relying upon and to argue their relevancy or irrelevancy as to the
ultimate conclusion the commission is called upon to make.
The courts and commissions are inclined, however, to restrict,
rather than to extend, the prohibitions on judicial notice declared by
the Supreme Court in the Abilene and Southern case. The technical
requirements of judicial proof are not insisted upon. If the data is
made part of the record,32 it may, of course, be relied upon; and even
if it is not formally introduced in evidence, no valid objection can be
made if the parties involved know what is to be used and enter no
objection at the time of the hearing.33
Another doctrine akin to judicial notice, but formally at least dis-
tinguishable from it, operates also to liberalize the rule of the Abilene
and Southern case. While the commissions may not employ their
undisclosed knowledge and records as a substitute for necessary evi-
dence, they may nevertheless use such material in accepting and weigh-
ing the evidence that is offered by the parties.3 4  The difference be-
31. See People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86, 95, ioo N. E.
705, 707 (1912) ; Wisconsin P. & L. Co. v. Beloit, 215 Wis. 439, 444, 254 N. W. ig,
122 (1934).
32. United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299 (1927). "Data col-
lected by the Commission as a part of its function of investigation, constitute ordinarily
evidence sufficient to support an order, if the data are duly made part of the record in
the case in which the order is entered." Id. at 312.
33. Georgia Cont. Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm., 8 F. Supp. 434 (N. D.
Ga. i934) ; Hoffman v. Public Serv. Comm., 99 Pa. Super. 417 (193o) ; Gillis v. Public
Serv. Comm., 105 Pa. Super. 389, 161 Atl. 563 (1932); Duluth St. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm., 161 Wis. 245, 152 N. W. 887 (I915).
"All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered,
and must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and
offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. . . . But an administrative tribunal may
take notice of results reached by it in other cases, when its doing so is made to appear
on the record and the facts thus noted are specified so that matters of law are saved."
Hoffman v. Public Serv. Comm., supra, at 428.
"Of course, common fairness would dictate that the plaintiff be advised of the
appraisal made by the employees of the Commission, if the Commission intended to use
such figures as a basis for decision. We do not understand it to be claimed that there
was any intentional suppression by the Commission of evidentiary matters of this kind."
Duluth St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., supra, at 257, 152 N. W. at 891.
34. The Interstate Commerce Commission has reserved to itself the right to use
the Commission's files for the purpose of checking the accuracy or inaccuracy of tesrr-
monial and other evidence offered at the hearing. Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York
Cent. & H. R. R., 30 I. C. C. 415 (1914) ; Oklahoma Cottonseed Crushers Ass'n v.
Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 39 I. C. C. 497 (1916).
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tween this and judicial notice proper is slight. What a trier of fact
does when he checks, rejects or weighs evidence introduced by the
parties against his own official knowledge or records is really to use
this latter data as evidence to rebut or explain that which is introduced
by the parties. In other words, while such knowledge and records may
not be used as primary evidence, they may nevertheless be employed
as rebutting or contradictory evidence. It must be admitted that this
is a considerable qualification to the rules declared in Ohio Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission and United States v. Abilene
and Southern Ry.35
III
Ex PARTE INVESTIGATIONS
The public service commission statutes uniformly not only confer
the power, but also impose the duty, upon the regulating commission
to investigate independently all matters relating to public utilities.8 6
A survey of the commission statutes will show the very important part
that the ex parte investigation by the commission plays in public service
commission procedurea 7  The decisions with respect to judicial notice,
Neither is a commission as an expert body bound to accept opinion evidence as to
value, etc., of the experts testifying before it. McGregor-Noe v. Springfield G. & E.
Co., I Mo. P. S. C. R. 468 (914); Borough of Kane v. Spring Water Co., 4 Pa. P.
S. C. R. 628 0920). "But we cannot accept the respondent's contention that the Com-
mission in weighing the evidence and reaching its conclusions must adopt as its judg-
ment the opinion of experts called by the parties to express their views on these mat-
ters. These questions may be helpful in reaching a conclusion, but they are not obli-
gatory on the Commission whose right and duty is to apply to all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence, including the opinions of these experts, its own knowledge acquired
by observation and experience in arriving at what it deems a fair and just allowance
for these elements of value." Id. at 630.
It also seems that even as to specific facts testified to, the commission may use its
own acquired knowledge in accepting and weighing them. Elizabeth v. Board of Pub.
Util. Comm'rs, 99 N. J. L. 496, 123 AtI. 358 (1924); Chicago & N. W. R. PR v. Rail-
road Comm., i56 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1915); Williams v. Farmers Tel. Co., 4
Wis. P. S. C. P- 32 (I933).
35. See Hanft, supra note I6, at 22.
36. See supra pp. 143, 144.
37. INTERSTATE CoMmERcE AcT, 24 STAr. 383 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1929),
after providing that any person may complain to the commission of any act or omis-
sion by a carrier contrary to the terms of the statute, and providing for a service of such
complaint upon the carrier involved, continues, "if . . . such carrier shall not satisfy
the complaint within the time specified, or there shall appear to be reasonable ground
for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate
the matters complained of in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper."
I Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5166 (2,3) ; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill, 193o) C. 49, §48;
WIs. STAT. (1931) § i96.26 (I) are substantially the same.
ILL. Rv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. ilia, lf55, prohibits the carrier from charging
less for a long than for a short haul, but provides, "Upon application to the Commis-
sion, any common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation, be authorized by
the Commission to charge less for a longer than for a shorter distance."
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § 1123b, relates to applications for
permission to engage in the public utility business, make extensions, etc., and provides,
"for the purpose of enabling the commission to make such finding or determination, it
shall hold such hearings . . . and . . . it may make such inquiries, physical examina-
tions, valuations, and investigations . . . as it may deem necessary. . . ." Wis.
STAT. (I93I) § 196.28, "Whenever the commission shall believe that any rate or charge
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however, make it apparent that this investigatory power is not un-
limited. In spite of the duty to investigate, commissions may not use
the results of such investigations as a basis for their decisions without
introducing the same in evidence if a hearing is demanded and a
matter of right as distinguished from a mere privilege is involved.38
A customary method is to introduce at the hearing the written report
of the investigation made by commission employees. 39 Such reports
are then usually considered merely as evidence in the case, and not,
because of their official source, as representing the final and conclusive
determination of the commission. In case of conflict between experts,
however, there is a natural inclination to give somewhat greater weight
to the findings of the commission's own presumably unbiased experts. 40
Whether the parties to the proceedings have the constitutional right to
cross-examine the experts and other employees of the commission who
have investigated and submitted their reports raises an important and
difficult question. Most court decisions declare as a matter of course
may be unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or that any service is inadequate or
cannot be obtained or that an investigation of any matter relating to any railroad or
public utility should for any reason be made, it may on its own motion summarily in-
vestigate the same with or without notice."
38. United States, C. & C. T. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R., 226 U. S. i4,
20 (1912); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson
Tel. Mfg. Co., 46 F. (2d) 612 (App. D. C. i93i) ; Farmers Elev. Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. Ry., 266 Ill. 567, 107 N. E. 841 (1915) ; Wichita R. & L. Co. v. Court of Ind.
Rel., X13 Kan. 217, 214 Pac. 797 (1923) ; Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga G. & E. Co.,
191 N. Y. 123, 147, 83 N. E. 693, 700 (19o8) ; State ex reL. Hughes v. Milhollan, 5o N.
D. 184, 195 N. W. 292 (1923); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Public Serv. Comm., 69 Pa.
Super. 404 (1918) ; Sabre v. Rutland R. R., 86 Vt. 347, 354, 85 Atl. 693, 696 (1913).
See also Errington v. Minister of Health, [1924] 1 K. B. 249. In St. Louis, S. W. Ry.
v. Stewart, 5o Ark. 586, 235 S. W. 1003 (1921), however, the commission entered an
order for the erection of a new railroad station at a certain town. The commission's
order recited that the conditions in the town had been inspected by the engineers of the
commission and by the members of the commission. The Arkansas court sustained the
commission's order. It held that while the commission could not enter an order in the
absence of evidence in the record, that they might make an ex parte investigation for
the purpose merely of better understanding the evidence in the record. The report of
the commission's engineer was merely advisory and not evidentiary. That seems an un-
justifiable rule. Even though there be evidence in the record to sustain the order, the
parties should have the right to know all matters which might influence the commission
in arriving at its determination.
39. People v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., i65 N. Y. 362, 59 N. E. 138 (igoi);
In re Crystal City Gas Co., N. Y. P. S. C. R. 125 (1925); In re Mo. Southern R. R.,
3 Mo. P. S. C. R. I (i915). In an address before the Wisconsin Bar Association,
Commissioner Kannenberg of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission said, "Even after
the hearing is closed, if the Commission is not satisfied as to the facts, it frequently
sends out its own engineers, accountants or other investigators to determine and report
what the facts are. Such reports are submitted to the interested parties, and the de-
cision is frequently based entirely thereon." (1929) i9 Wis. B. A. REP. 118, 122.
40. Palo Alto v. Palo Alto Gas Co., 2 Cal. R. R. Comm. 300, 312 (1913) ; In re
Murray, 2 Cal. R. R. Comm., 464, 518 (1913) ; In re Main Municipal Water Dist., 6
Cal. R. R. Comm. 507, 514 (1915); West End Business Men's Ass'n v. United Ry.,
2 Mo. P. S. C. R. 357, 362 (1915) ; In re Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 3 Mo. P. S. C. R.
75, 100 (1915).
In absence of other testimony, a commission is not justified in making a decision
contrary to the reports of its own experts. Ohio Util. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 267
U. S. 359 (1925); Monroe Gaslight Co. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm., 292 Fed. 139,
148 (E. D. Mich. x923).
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and without serious consideration that the right to a hearing includes
the right to cross-examine the witnesses. 41  From the standpoint of
the commissions, however, this claim to the right of cross-examination
causes difficulty. An investigation in an important utility case may
consume many months, and many different employees may partake in
it. At the time the matter comes up for hearing, these employees may
be scattered over the state busily engaged in other duties. To compel
them to be present at every hearing where their reports are involved,
to testify in person, and to insist on the technicality of judicial pro-
cedure and rules of evidence would seriously hamper commissions in
the performance of their public duties. Because of these considera-
tions the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, in a fairly recent
decision, denied that the right of cross-examination existed in such a
case.
42
IV
WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A COMMISSION'S ORDER
The rule which requires public utility commissions to base their
orders on evidence introduced at the hearing necessarily raises the
question of what constitutes sufficient and competent evidence to justify
an order. The movement to substitute commissions for the regularly
constituted courts was undoubtedly partially based on a desire to avoid
the technicality of common-law rules of procedure and evidence. In-
deed the statutes quite often provide that the commissions shall not
be bound by the technical rules of evidence.43  This general statement
is frequently echoed by the commissions, courts and text writers.
44
41. Washington ex rel. Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1912) ;
Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88 (1913); Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929); Casebolt v.
Sligo & E. Ry., i Mo. P. S. C. R. 416 (1914); People ex rel. Binghamton L., H. & P.
Co. v. Stevens, 2o3 N. Y. 7, 96 N. E. 114 (1911) ; Lindsey v. Public Util. Comm., ii
Ohio St. 6, 144 N. E. 729 (1924); Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 78 Pa. Super. 593 (1922) ; Philadelphia v. Public Serv. Comm., 84 Pa. Super.
135 (1924) ; and see also cases cited supra note 38. In Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm., supra, in a proceeding relating to the rerouting of a certain
trolley line, the commission asked for a report by the engineer of the city of Philadel-
phia, but refused the parties the right to cross-examine the engineer, claiming that his
report should not be treated as a part of the record or as evidence, since it was merely
helpful in securing some independent man to give to the commission his views on the
subject. The court held this to be error.
42. Miller v. Midway Tel. Co., 3 Wis. P. S. C. R. 63, 71 (1932).
43. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 49, § 20, "And in all investigations, in-
quiries or hearings the commission . . . shall not be bound by the technical rules
of evidence." To similar effect see CAI. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 6386, § 53;
Iii. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. xila, Il179; 1 Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5144.
44. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117 (1920): Western Paper
Makers Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926); Schuylkill Ry. v. Public
Serv. Comm., 71 Pa. Super. 204 (1919) ; Logan v. Utah P. & L. Co., P. U. R. I928B
410 (Pub. Serv. Comm. Utah). See also 4 SHAIFsMAN, op. cit. supra note i, at 201,
206-220; STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933)
20-31, 32-46; Wheat, supra note I, 15 CALIF. L. Ra-. at 445; Kannenberg, Practice Be-
fore the Railroad Commission (1929) 19 Wis. B. A. REP. II8, 122, "At the hearings the
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It is a mistake, however, to assume that the general principles regard-
ing proof in judicial proceedings are entirely disregarded. In some of
the leading cases it appears either that the incompetent evidence was
admitted without objection or that there was sufficient competent evi-
dence in the record to sustain the commission's order.45  In one com-
petent author's careful study of the procedure of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission appears the following:
"It is ordinarily said that rules of evidence are not strictly
applied, and it is true that considerable leeway is allowed, although
there is a noticeable tendency to adhere more closely to the funda-
mental rules. All of the applicable rules are recognized and should
be observed by counsel.
"Hearsay evidence should not be submitted. It may be ad-
mitted without objection if offered, but it is always of little
probative value. . . . The rules for qualifying an opinion wit-
ness are the same before the commission as in a court of law ...
The true test is not its admission with or without objection but the
weight that can be given the testimony once it is upon the record.
Parties seem to overlook the fact that the commission must base
its findings upon the relevant, admissible, probative evidence and
that when a charge is made that it has not done so, the rules by
which the evidence will be determined are the rules of evidence
as applied by a court." 41
The exact extent to which the common law rules of evidence are
applied undoubtedly varies considerably. The precise situation can be
determined only by careful study of the stenographic records made in
individual cases by each commission.47 Probably the only general
principle that can be enunciated in absence of such extensive studies is
that a commission exercises considerable discretion in admitting evi-
dence. If it believes that the adverse party is not seriously harmed or
inconvenienced by the admission of the questioned evidence, having
reasonable opportunity to check the proffered proof, objections based
on technical grounds will be overruled.48  However, if the evidence
commission is not bound or restricted by the ordinary rules of law and technical rules
of evidence. Hearsay testimony is often received and considered, according to the
weight which it seems to deserve."
On the general subject, see Stephan, Extent to Which Fact Finding Boards Should
Be Bound by Rides of Evidence (938) 24 A. B. A. J. 630.
45. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117 (1920); Western Paper
Makers Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926).
46. HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note I, at 72.
47. See Brown, The Administration of Workmen's Compensation in Wisconsin
(935) io Wis. L. REy. 431, 440.
48. Copies of records have been admitted in violation of the best evidence rule
when the adverse party has easy access to the originals. Schuylkill Ry. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm., 268 Pa. 430, 112 At1. 5 (1920). In Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Commerce
Comm., 345 Ill. 576, 178 N. E. 157 (193), involving an application for a certificate of
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submitted is deemed to be of little probative value, or if the adverse
party is deprived of an opportunity to ascertain the true state of the
primary evidence through cross-examination or otherwise, the evi-
dence is apt to be excluded. 49  The commissions perhaps are coming
to realize that, in confining the evidence to matters actually at issue
convenience and necessity, the court held that the commission did not err in receiving
after the hearing a certified copy of a necessary consent order of the Highway Com-
mission. Since the order spoke for itself the parties were not prejudiced by its admis-
sion. See also Florida v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 477 (N. D. Ga. 1933), upholding
a commission order where evidence was admitted in claimed violation of the best evi-
dence rule. The New York court has sustained the admission of affidavits as to specific
facts. People ex teL Terminal Ry. v. Board of R. R. Comm., 53 App. Div. 61, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 597 (3d Dep't, igoo), af'd, 64 N. Y. 572, 58 N. E. 1O91 (igoo) ; and Pennsyl-
vania has sustained the use by the commission of records in other cases before the com-
mission, to disclose the general facts relating to the business regulated, when the parties
were notified that such use would be made. Hoffman v. Public Serv. Comm., 99 Pa.
Super. 417 (1930).
49. As a general rule, records in other proceedings before the commission are not
regarded as admissible evidence of the facts disclosed in such records. Williamson v.
Railroad Comm., 193 Cal. 22, 222 Pac. 8o3 (1924) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Com-
merce Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929); Moline Consumers Co. v. Commerce
Comm., 353 Ill. 119, 187 N. E. 161 (1933) ; Application of the Borough of Conneaut-
ville, 6 Pa. P. S. C. R. 95 (1922). Mere opinion evidence is also not regarded as com-
petent unless the facts on which the opinion is based are properly introduced. In Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected
evidence of a witness testifying from blueprints as to the grades and curves on the lines
of other railroads because they said blueprints were not properly verified and intro-
duced. In In re Wisconsin Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1931E 97 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
1931), the question was raised as to the reasonableness of prices paid for equipment by
the Wisconsin Telephone Co. to the Western Electric Co., an affiliate of the Wisconsin
Co. The comptroller of the Western Electric Co., in testifying before the commission,
submitted a summary of sales and net earnings of his company drawn from a large
amount of data. The commission refused to accept such testimony unless the data on
which it was based was also introduced in evidence. While the commission stated that
it was not bound by the common law rules of evidence, it regarded its holding as in-
volving a principle of fair proceedings which it was not at liberty to disregard. See
also Ashton v. Potter Gas Co., 6 Pa. P. S. C. R. 286 (1923) ; People ex rel. Terminal
Ry. v. Board of R. R. Comm., 53 App. Div. 6I, 65 N. Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dep't, 19oo),
aff'd, 164 N. Y. 572, 58 N. E. 1O9i (19oo) ; Hempstead v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting
Co., N. Y. P. S. C. R. 138 (1921). The Supreme Court of Vermont in In re Trustees
of Village of Westminster, io8 Vt. 352, 187 AtI. 519 (1936), refused to accept an order
for a certificate of convenience and necessity when several witnesses before the com-
mission testified as to what they had heard other people say as to the need for the
service applied for. Such a violation of the hearsay rule was regarded as prejudicial.
The court distinguished the prior case of Squires v. O'Connell, 91 Vt. 35, 99 Atl. 268
(1916), which admitted a survey and valuation of a utility through the testimony of the
individual in charge of said survey, without requiring the testimony of all his assistants
who had assisted him in the work.
Cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission on claims of shippers for re-
funds for excess charges are illuminating. After a decision that a protested rate is
excessive the practice is for the shippers who have been affected by the previous excess
rate to assign their claims to one individual for prosecution. In such cases the com-
mission demands that there be testimony by one who knows of his own knowledge that
the original claimants actually paid the excess charges for which return is demanded,
and they will not accept affidavits if objected to as proof. Griffing v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 32 I. C. C. 283 (1914) ; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Director Gen., 89 I. C. C. 359
(1924); Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Arizona E. R. R., 148 I. C. C. 695 (1928). Rule V
of the commission's Rules of Practice adapts the commission procedure to the practical
exigencies of the situation presented. By this rule the shippers, on a form prescribed
by the commission, present the details of their claim. These are then submitted to the
various carriers for verification, and when so verified constitute sufficient evidence on
which to base an order. This procedure has been approved by the courts. World Pub.
Co. v. Davis, 16 F. (2d) 130 (N. D. Okla. 1926).
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and in excluding that which is of doubtful probative value the common-
law rules of evidence have some virtue."
Of greater practical moment than the competency of evidence
under common law rules is the question of what evidence shall be re-
garded as relevant and probative. This may be illustrated by the
problem arising in connection with commission orders fixing rates on
specific commodities between specific points of origin and destination.
In regard to such rates it is practically impossible to determine on the
basis of actual cost of service and overhead what is an intrinsically
just and reasonable rate. Reliance must be placed upon comparative
rates charged by the carrier and accepted by shippers and the regulating
authorities without protest.5 ' It is apparent, however, that comparative
rates may be relied upon only when the conditions surrounding the
comparable rate and the contested rate are substantially the same. In
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Public Works,52 the Supreme
Court of the United States unanimously overruled an order of the
regulating commission of the state of Washington fixing specific rates
5o. In re Burlington Transportation Co., P. U. R. I93oC 380 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 193o), which involved an application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity, the Missouri Public Service Commission had the following to say at 383 concern-
ing the evidence submitted to it:
"The Commission has heretofore made reference to the great amount of incompe-
tent, irrelevant, immaterial, and hearsay testimony in this case, but in many cases it is
like hunting for the proverbial needle in a haystack to find in the mass of evidence
offered, the character of testimony the Commission should have in order to enable it to
reach a conclusion. There is no reason why the same character of evidence should not
be produced in a hearing before the Public Service Commission that is required to
establish a fact in any other forum. The fact that the Public Service Commission Law
provides that 'no formality in any proceeding nor in the manner of taking testimony
before the Commission or any Commissioner shall invalidate any order, decision, rule,
or regulation made, approved, or confirmed by the Commission,' does not justify the
Commission in accepting testimony that is neither competent, relevant, nor material.
"In determining whether public convenience and necessity will be promoted by the
creation of the proposed motor carrier service, the Commission should base its judg-
ment on testimony showing the conditions with reference to the existing facilities for
motor carrier service, and the ability and willingness of the applicant to furnish the
proposed service, together with other competent and material evidence that may be
offered, but not upon the conclusions of witnesses, upon hearsay testimony nor upon
affidavits, resolutions and petitions. The maker of an affidavit and the signer of a peti-
tion or resolution is not present at the hearing to be cross-examined. The Commission
should not be expected to base its findings of fact and conclusions upon statements
found in petitions, resolutions, or affidavits.
"Petitions and resolutions, and verified and unverified letters are often valuable and
always welcomed by the Commission when they can be used as a basis for an investi-
gation or inquiry as to the rates or service of a public utility. They are also valuable
to the extent that they may show the relations that exist between the public utility and
its patrons and the general public. The rules of evidence, however, cannot be changed
by the Public Service Commission. Its liberality in accepting pleadings that are not
formal and its method of hearing matters before it in an informal way does not justify
the introduction of incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and hearsay testimony. No
testimony should come before the Public Service Commission in any proceeding that
will not aid it in making its finding of fact and conclusions on the issues, and it should
not consider any other testimony."
51. Moline Consumers Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 353 Ill. 119, 187 N. E. 161
(1933). See in general 3 SHARFMAIN, op. ct. supra note i, at io-ii, 473-74, 521-25,
569-70.
52. 268 U. S. 39 (1925).
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on logs. The commission relied solely on the average cost of hauling
all traffic in the state by its four railroad systems and neglected the
testimony of the respondent road as to the cost of hauling the com-
modity in question for the short average distance of 30 miles.53  The
Illinois courts have been particularly strict in this matter. Atchison &
S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm.54 involved an order of the state com-
merce commission reducing rates on coal from points near Springfield
to Peoria and Pekin, Illinois. The commission had relied in part on
the fact that, whereas the average increase of freight rates from 191o
to 1924 was 65 0, the rates in question had been increased from i iO
to 125 . The order was reversed on the ground that the test was the
reasonableness of the rates in force at the time of the hearing, and a
mere percentage increase over the average rates was not proof of
present unreasonableness. The commission had also relied on rates
on coal in other localities and, to show that the conditions were the
same, referred to findings of fact in proceedings before the Interstate
Commerce Commission and in other cases before the Illinois Commis-
sion. Again this was held improper since the evidence of the com-
parable conditions was not within the record and involved testimony
and findings in other cases between different parties. This decision
is typical of the strict attitude taken by the Illinois court,5 5 though the
federal courts apparently give to the Interstate Commerce Commission
a greater leeway in applying judicial knowledge as to the similarity of
conditions between the compared rates and the rate in controversy. 56
The Illinois rulings place a practically impossible burden upon a party
protesting a rate. All the facts relating to the cost of service and other
conditions of traffic are in the possession of the carrier. To require
the protester to show that the conditions between the protested rate
and comparable rates are similar before being allowed to introduce in
evidence the comparable rate bars him from effective progress in the
proceedings.
53. To similar effect see Florida Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 167 (914) (re-
versing an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission reducing rates on fruit hauled
by the Florida East Coast Company when the commission relied on the increased traffic
carried by other lines where conditions were not the same) ; Florida v. United States,
282 U. S. 194 (1931) (reversing an order increasing state rates on lumber because of
a claimed discrimination as to interstate commerce. The evidence was insufficient to
show such discrimination to exist. After a new hearing, however, in which further
evidence was obtained, the commission was affirmed. 4 F. Supp. 477 (N. D. Ga. 1933),
aff'd, 292 U. S. I (1934)); West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662
(935) (overruling the state commission for use of commodity price indices to show
that the commission's property had decreased in value).
54. 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929).
55. Alton & So. R. R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 316 Ill. 625, 147 N. E. 417
(1925) ; Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Traction Co., 335 Ill. 247, 167 N. E. 38
(1929); Chicago & Eastern Ill. Ry. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 341 IIl. 277, 173 N. E.
380 (1930).
56. Western Paper Makers Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926);
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CONCLUSION
The essential problem of public service commission procedure is,
as previously stated,5 7 a satisfactory reconciliation between the com-
mission's undoubted duty to guard and advance the public interest in
utility services and charges, and at the same time to preserve the con-
stitutional right of the utilities to a procedure that accords with due
process of law. The utilities and the private parties affected have a
constitutional right to an open hearing whenever their private interests
are affected. 8 The usual procedure provides for such a hearing at
which the contesting parties present their testimonial and documentary
evidence. In this situation, the requirement that the commissions must
base their decision solely on the evidence presented at such hearings 59
and the prohibition of reliance upon knowledge acquired by experience
or independent investigation 60 or on evidentiary material contained in
their own files 61 clearly hamper the commissions in their duty affirm-
atively to protect at all times the public interests in adequate service
and fair tariffs. After the hearing is closed the commission may, of
course, reopen the matter for the presentation of such further evidence
it has obtained bearing on the issues at hand, but this would cause
delay in an already protracted proceeding. Is there not another pos-
sible procedure that would more satisfactorily advance the public in-
terest and at the same time amply protect the private rights of the
utilities ?
It is believed that it is a mistake and an undesirable departure
from the essential principles of administrative regulation and adjudica-
tion to pattern public service commission procedure too closely on the
judicial model. These regulatory commissions differ from the or-
dinary courts of justice: first, in the specialized and technical character
of the problems which the great majority of cases involve; second, in
the existence of a positive duty to represent the public by protecting
the interests of the thousands of consumers, who naturally cannot be
personally represented at the hearing; and third, in the capacity with
which the commissions are endowed by law and experience to bring to
Montrose Oil Ref. Co. v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 25 F. (2d) 750 (N. D. Tex. 1927). See
also Wickwire Steel Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R., 3o I. C. C. 415 (914) ; Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm., 68 Colo. 92, 188 Pac. 747 (1920).
The federal courts have also been liberal in cases involving a number of carriers in
permitting the commission to rely upon evidence typical of all carriers in the group.
New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923); Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S.
564 (1927) ; Beaumont, St. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 789 (W. D. Mo.
1929), af'd, 282 U. S. 74 (930).
57. See supra p. 145.
58. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (i89o).
59. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88 (I913).
6o. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 3O U. S. 292 (I937), and see cases
cited supra note 38.
61. United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1924).
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the solution of these problems their own inherent and acquired knowl-
edge. The essential and underlying principle of the leading cases,
Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., Ohio
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Util. Comm., and United States v. Abilene
& Southern Ry. is that the parties to the proceeding are not to be ad-
judged on evidence undisclosed to them, but that they are entitled to
hear such evidence so that they may rebut or explain it. It does not
follow, however, that to safeguard these rights such evidence must
necessarily be presented at open hearing by the usual method of oral
testimony and by tedious and often futile cross-examination of the
witnesses. In criminal actions and in civil damage suits before a jury,
there is often sharp conflict as to fact occurrences lying within the
customary experience of ordinary men: There is also an undoubted
advantage in having the witnesses personally present before the triers
of the fact in order that the truth of the story which they are telling
may be determined from their conduct and demeanor. Such situations
are not, however, customarily presented to the public service commis-
sions. On the contrary, the usual primary evidence is documentary in
character, contained in the records of the utilities, in accounts of re-
ceipts and expenditures, in records of goods and passengers carried,
in inventories, and in valuations based thereon. The usual conflict
arises from the proper deductions which accountants, engineers, and
rate experts attempt to draw therefrom.6 2 Material of this character
is best presented, not by the transitory oral utterances of witnesses,
but in the form of written documents and reports, which the adjudicat-
ing tribunal should be given ample opportunity to analyze and appraise
for relevance and cogency. It is desirable that a procedure be devised
which will meet the exigencies of this situation.
The present author will not offer a complete working model of
public service commission procedure. That should be done only after
careful and extensive study by those who, through daily experience,
have first hand knowledge of the actual conduct of the commission's
business. Many controversies are now settled through correspondence
and informal discussion between the commission and the utilities in-
volved.63  This method has proved efficacious, should be retained, and
perhaps more widely used.64 Such procedure can, however, be adopted
62. Smith, supra note I, at 431.
63. See Rules of Practice III a-g, 8 INTERSTATE CommERCE ACTS ANN. (1934)
6230; 4 SHARFMAN, OP. cit. supra note I, at 17o; Smith, supra note I, at 417; Wheat,
supra note I, 15 CALIF. L. REv. at 452.
64. The section on public utility law of the American Bar Association has recom-
mended informal conferences between the commission, the utilities and the public as a
means of solving without the expense and delay of protracted hearings many contro-
verted questions. (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 752; Guernsey, Regulation by Conference
(1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 65o; PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION RAILROAD AND
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION PROCEDURE
only when all the parties are in a compromising mood and expressly
consent thereto. For the actually litigated case, would not the issues
be more sharply defined, the orderly offer of proof be secured, un-
necessary time consuming examination of witnesses be eliminated, a
more thorough and scientific investigation of the fundamental issues
of a controversy be made possible, and at the same time the funda-
mental right of the parties to a fair hearing be preserved by a pro-
cedure patterned on the following lines? At a stated time fixed by
the commission after the issues have been formally joined by com-
plaint, answer and replication, let the party bearing the burden of
proof submit to the commission and his adversary in written form:
(a) the necessary primary evidence taken from accounts, inventories
and other records; (b) the affidavits of witnesses when oral testimony
is necessary to present matters not of record; and (c) most important,
the analyses, summaries and conclusions drawn by the experts from
the primary evidence so submitted. After a reasonable time allowed
for the examination and investigation of such evidence, the adversary,
who in the meantime has been preparing his own case, should then
submit his evidence in a similar form and manner. Rebutting evi-
dence by the first party could also be offered if deemed necessary.
Where oral cross-examination of the individuals submitting the reports
is thought necessary, it should be allowed in proceedings conducted,
not before the commission (unless specially ordered), but before an
examiner, court commissioner, or other official appointed by the com-
mission for the purpose. After the evidence has thus been submitted,
the commission is then ready to exercise its adjudicating function. In
so doing, however, it should not be restricted to the evidence submitted
by the parties. It should have the opportunity and indeed be invested
as a representative of the people with the duty of applying to the solu-
tion of the problem all the information it can obtain. It should be
permitted to resort to its own records and to the results of its own ex
parte investigations, and the doctrine of judicial notice should be
liberally applied. Of course the fundamental right of the parties to
know the evidence against them must be preserved. This can be done
by requiring the commission to issue tentative findings of fact and
conclusions of law, being careful in so doing to refer specifically to the
matters to which it has resorted which are not in the statements sub-
mitted by the parties. Again, cross-examination of the individuals
who have made reports relied upon by the commission should be
allowed. On the tentative report so made the hearing before the com-
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS (1932) 38O-42O. For a report of proceedings conducted in
this manner, see In re Revision of Uniform Classifications of Accounts, I Wis. P. S. C.
R. 257 (1931).
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mission should be held, the parties being required to file explicit objec-
tions to the specific matters in the tentative decision, whether the same i
be findings of fact or conclusions of law. On these specific objections
the issues would be finally drawn, briefs filed, oral arguments held
before the commission, and the case finally drawn to a conclusion.
The proposition so made is not entirely novel. Those familiar
with the procedure of the Interstate Commerce Commission will recog-
nize in it the shortened procedure provided by Rule X-a of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission Rules of Procedure 65 and the proposed
report practice of the same Commission wherein the examiner makes
a tentative report to which the parties are allowed to make exceptions
and on which they file briefs and hold oral arguments before the Com-
mission itself.60 It is not an indispensable feature of a hearing that
evidence be submitted in person before the adjudicating tribunal. The
ancient practice of the court of chancery was to submit evidence in the
form of depositions, and the present Court of Claims secures evidence
in a like manner.67 The requirement of a preliminary report to which
specific exceptions may be filed is also not novel and should conserve
rather than waste time.6 By means of it the actual controverted issues
65. This procedure, in substance, substitutes for the oral presentation of evidence,
written memoranda of facts and argument. While it can be applied only with the con-
sent of the parties and is customarily used only in the less difficult and important cases,
roughly one-third of the formal complaints to the commission are disposed of in this
manner. See 4 SHARFMA, op. cit. supra note I, at 220; Smith, supra note I, at 419.
66. This procedure has received the obiter blessing of the United States Supreme
Court. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 478 (1936). See also, 4 SHAnR-
MAN, op. Cit. supra note I, at 229; Smith, supra note I, at 44o. Concerning this pro-
cedure, Professor Sharfman says: "The method of proposed reports, exceptions and
argument, as described above, has proved to be of great value to all concerned. Pro-
posed reports focus attention upon the controlling issues and their disposition, and thus
subject the essentials of the controversy to the close scrutiny of the parties prior to
actual decision. . . . The Commission has said: 'Our practice of requiring the filing
of specific exceptions to the report of the examiner is in the interest of fairness to op-
posing parties and to the Commission, and to prevent that element of surprise which
has no place in a proceeding where we are acting legislatively to lay down a rule of
conduct for the future. Compliance with the rule is desirable as well for the conserva-
tion of the time of the Commission, and permits a more orderly and speedy review of
the contentions presented for our decision. . . .' Finally, affording the parties oppor-
tunity for oral argument, as a supplement to exceptions rather than as a substitute for
them, has been found to be an indispensable aid to just determinations. While applica-
tions may be granted or denied in the discretion of the Commission or its divisions, a
very liberal policy has been consistently followed in passing upon requests of the parties
for oral argument. The Commission recognizes the undoubted advantages which accrue
from having the issues and their disposition presented directly to those charged with
responsibility for authoritative action."
67. See RULES OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES (1927).
68. The usual public service commission statute has liberal provision for rehear-
ing and at times requires an application for rehearing as a prerequisite to review before
the regular courts. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 6386, § 66; ILL. REv. STAT.
(Cahill, 1933) c. iia, 186; I Mo. REv. STAT. (929) § 5233; N. Y. CONSOL. LAws
(McKinney, 1917) c. 480, §22; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i937) tit. 66, § 1396;
Wis. STAT. (ig3i) § 196.405. See also 8 I. C. C. Acts ANN. (Supp. 1934) Rule XV.
By Act of Feb. 24, 1925, the Court of Claims is authorized to appoint commis-
sioners to take evidence and submit reports and findings to which the parties file objec-
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are segregated, and the time of the parties and of the adjudicating
tribunal is devoted to the vital controversy instead of being wasted by
obstructive tactics seeking for technical advantages in matters often
immaterial and not as a matter of actual fact subject to denial. More-
over, by such procedure the fundamental right of the parties to a
hearing is preserved; for it is well settled that due process of law is
not infringed if the parties before a final and conclusive determination
of the controversy are entitled to a hearing.69 Indeed, through the
previous disclosure of the precise matters on which the commission
relies for its determination, an even greater protection' is given to
private interests than is the case in ordinary judicial or commission
practice.
It may be objected by some that the practical elimination of the
oral presentation of evidence is undesirable. In that manner informa-
tion may be obtained that would otherwise be unavailable; and in case
of matters widely affecting many individuals-for example, in pro-
ceedings to abandon a line of railroad-there is perhaps a psychological
advantage in permitting the individual citizens involved to appear in
person and publicly present their case.70 However, the consideration
that is particularly important is the enabling of the public service com-
mission to perform its duty to the public by utilizing all information
it has at its command, and, at the same time, protecting the right of
the parties to know the evidence on which the final determination
depends. If the suggestions are deemed too drastic, this last objective
may be reached simply by providing that the commission in making
its determination may use whatever evidence it can obtain provided the
parties affected by the commission's order are given an absolute right
to a rehearing concerning all evidentiary matter in the order obtained
outside of the formal record made at the regular hearing.
The present author firmly believes that the most vital point in
administrative law today concerns administrative procedure. While
tions and submit arguments to the court. 43 STAT. 964 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § ii
(Supp. 1937).
Under the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Insurance Act, Wis. STAT.
(1937) § io8.og, claims for benefits under the Act are first decided ex parte by a deputy
of the commission and copies of the determination mailed to the parties. From such
determination the parties have a right to appeal to the commission. See RULES OF Wis-
CONSIN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RELATING TO UNEMPLOYMENT RESERVES AND COM-
PENSATION Acr, Rules 400-420.
In tax matters, the normal procedure is for the assessing officer first to make an
ex parte determination. From this determination the taxpayer may appeal and he is
then entitled to a hearing. See for example, INTERNAL REVENUE Acr OF 1936, § 272,
49 STAT. 1721 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § 272 (Supp. 1937).
69. United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 291 U. S. 457 (I934); Phillips v. Com-
missioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931).
7o. See Feller, supra note 3, at 66o. This last point was made to the writer per-
sonally by Mr. Phillip H. Porter, Chief Examiner and former Commissioner of the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission.
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the matter is discussed in bar association meetings and in legal period-
icals, little attempt has been made to grapple with the vital problems
that are present. It will not do to declare blithely that commission
procedure should be flexible and unbound by legal technicalities-and
then stop. Nor will it suffice to model commission procedure on that
prevailing in the regular courts of justice. Students must dig into
the subject, get a clear idea of the fundamental principles of adminis-
trative action, know the actual problems with which the commissions
are faced, and recognize clearly the rights of private parties to impar-
tial and informed treatment. As a modest step in that direction, this
paper is offered.
